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I. INTRODUCTION 
As interest in clean energy continues to grow throughout 
communities in the United States and energy reliability issues consistently 
plague the power grid, localizing the energy needs of communities through 
development of local distributed generation systems is key to improving 
the reliability, sustainability, and independence of community electricity 
needs. By utilizing existing incentives through the proper implementation 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) and 
simultaneously enacting community power legislation, communities can 
begin to move towards localized energy independence1 that is reliable, 
resilient, and clean. 
State public service commissions2 (“PSCs”), the state agencies 
that oversee implementation of PURPA and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) applicable regulations, play a critical 
role in promoting localized energy independence because they have 
significant authority over how PURPA’s incentives for local clean energy 
projects are carried out within a state. While proper state PSC 
implementation of PURPA and FERC regulations plays a major role in 
local clean energy development, state legislatures also have a critical role 
in enabling and incentivizing the development of local clean energy 
projects via the enactment of community power legislation. Taken 
together, positive action by state PSCs and state legislatures towards 
 
1. Localized energy independence relates to the goal of communities 
increasing their reliance on locally-sourced and, ideally, locally-owned power.  
2. PSCs oversee the rates and services provided by utilities, including 
electricity, natural gas, water, waste management, telecommunications, and 
transportation. The naming of PSCs vary by state and are also known as “public utility 
commissions” or “utility regulatory commissions,” among others.   
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enabling development of distributed generation power projects can help 
communities initiate development of localized energy independence 
leading to a cleaner, more resilient, and reliable electricity grid. 
There are three main parts to this article: background on PURPA; 
discussion of PURPA’s role in boosting local clean energy projects; and 
review of existing community power legislation in Colorado and Oregon. 
The first part of this paper provides a foundational understanding of 
PURPA and how existing FERC regulations, as well as decisions from the 
United States Supreme Court and various state Supreme Courts, have 
shaped state PSCs’ implementation of PURPA’s benefits. The second part 
discusses PURPA’s potential for boosting local clean energy projects by 
ensuring that all of the benefits that local clean energy projects provide 
utilities and the public are fully accounted for, including a review of recent 
steps taken by the Michigan PSC regarding PURPA implementation. In 
the final part, this article focuses on community power legislation and 
how, through structuring community power legislation to encompass 
PURPA’s incentives, such legislation can better help communities realize 
local energy independence.  
II. PURPA BACKGROUND 
 On November 9, 1978, to combat the Nation’s excessive 
dependence on centralized fossil fuel energy, PURPA was signed into 
law.3 In passing PURPA, Congress sought to protect Americans against 
the price volatility of fossil fuels and decrease the Nation’s electricity 
dependence on fossil fuels by decentralizing and diversifying the Nation’s 
energy sources.4 A major goal of PURPA is to encourage the development 
 
3. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, PUB. L. NO. 95-617, 
92 STAT. 3117 (1978) [hereinafter PURPA]; 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2005). 
4 . FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982) (noting, “Congress 
believed that increased use of these [renewable] sources of energy would reduce the 
demand for traditional fossil fuels.”); Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. 
Corp, 461 U.S. 402, 417 (1983) (concluding, “The basic purpose of § 210 of PURPA 
was to increase the utilization of cogeneration and small power production facilities 
and to reduce reliance on fossil fuels.”); S. Cal. Edison Co. San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61269, 62079 (FERC June 2, 1995) (finding “Congress was seeking 
to diversify the Nation's generation fuel mix and promote more efficient use of fossil 
fuels when they were used for generation by encouraging renewable technologies and 
cogeneration, in order to cushion against further price shock and reduce dependence 
on fossil fuels.”). 
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of cogeneration and small power production facilities.5 Small power 
production facilities, the focus of this paper, are facilities that use biomass, 
waste, or renewable resources (such as wind, water, or solar energy) to 
produce electric power.6 Small power production facilities qualify for 
PURPA benefits if they are 80 megawatts (“MWs”) or less, these facilities 
are known as qualifying facilities (“QFs”).7  
Overall, to accomplish its purpose and goals, PURPA aims to remove 
major barriers to market competition for QFs and encourage their 
development by simulating a free and open market and allowing 
independent power producers access to tightly guarded electricity markets 
of monopoly utilities.8 As appropriately summarized by the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, PURPA’s purpose is to “compel regulated electric 
utilities to purchase needed power from [QF] sources instead of building 
additional capacity or acquiring power from other regulated utilities.”9 In 
other words, every action under PURPA must be viewed through the lens 
of whether the action taken “encourage[s]” QF development, as required 
under 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), since encouraging QF development is the 
primary purpose of PURPA. 
 Prior to PURPA, three major barriers blocked the sale of 
electricity to utilities by small power production facilities. The first barrier 
was reluctance by traditional monopoly electric utilities to purchase power 
from small power production facilities at appropriate rates that would 
cover the cost of production and allow for sustainable economic returns 
for small power production facility owners—this is the primary barrier and 
is still a major barrier affecting small-scale clean energy development 
today.10 The second barrier PURPA seeks to breakdown involves utilities 
discriminatorily charging excessive rates to small power production 
facilities for back-up service, which is energy made available to a facility 
in the event of an unscheduled outage.11 The third barrier discouraging 
 
5. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a); Am. Paper Inst., 461 U.S. at 405 (noting 
Congress’ belief that demand for fossil fuel energy would be reduced by requiring 
purchases from qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities). 
6. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A) (2005). 
7. Am. Paper Inst., 461 U.S. at 405; 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a). 
8. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750–51. 
9. Pa. Elec. Co. v. Pa. Puc, 544 Pa. 475, 477, 677 A.2d 831, 832 (1996).  
10. Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations 
Implementing § 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 12,214-02, 12,215 (Feb. 25, 1980) (hereinafter “FERC Order No. 69”); 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750–51; see e.g. Vote Solar v. Mont. Dep’t Pub. Serv. Reg., 
473 P.3d 963 (Mont. 2020); MTSUN v. Mont. Dep’t Pub. Serv. Reg., 472 P.3d 1154 
(Mont. 2020). 
11. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214-02, 12,215. 
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small power production development included financial burdens imposed 
by state and federal regulations, such as certain provisions in the Federal 
Power Act (“FPA”), the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
(“PUHCA”), and state laws regulating electric utility rates and financial 
organization.12  
 PURPA introduced three primary mechanisms to overcome these 
barriers.13 To defeat the first barrier, § 210 of PURPA imposes a 
mandatory purchase obligation on utilities and requires that utility 
purchase rates of electricity generated by QFs be “just and reasonable to 
the electric consumers... and in the public interest” and that the rates do 
not “discriminate against [QFs].”14 Further, § 210 directs FERC to 
prescribe and, when needed, revise legally enforceable rules as needed to 
“encourage cogeneration and small power production.”15  
Using that authority and aiming to overcome the first barrier, FERC 
promulgated regulations outlining that utilities are obligated to purchase 
energy and capacity from QFs at the utility’s full “avoided cost,” which is 
further explained in part I(B) below, or at a negotiated avoided cost rate 
for certain QFs.16 To defeat the second barrier, FERC promulgated a 
regulation that provides QFs with the right to purchase certain services 
from utilities (back-up and maintenance power) at rates which are just and 
reasonable.17 FERC’s regulations also provides QFs with the right to 
interconnect with the utility’s transmission and distribution lines at a 
nondiscriminatory interconnection fee.18  
As for defeating the third barrier, § 210(e) of PURPA directs FERC to 
issue rules that exempt QFs from burdensome federal and state laws 
relating to electricity utilities.19  
 
12. Id.; Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750–51. 
13 . Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, What Are the Benefits of QF 
Status?, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/qf (last updated Dec. 29, 2017). 
14. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (b), (f), (h) (2005). 
15. Id. (emphasis added). 
16. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303–304 (Under 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.309–311, certain 
utilities are relieved from § 292.304 requirements by showing nondiscriminatory 
market access exists.). 
17. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.305–306. 
18. Id.  
19. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (2005) (To date, FERC has exempted QFs of 
30 MWs or smaller to the PUHCA, most sections of the FPA (except section 205, 206, 
and 207 which exemptions only apply to QFs with 20 MWs or less), and state laws 
and regulations governing rates, finances, and organizational aspects of utilities. See 
18 C.F.R. §§ 292.601–602.).  
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A. PURPA Implementation: A Balancing Act  
Between FERC and State PSCs 
 Though PURPA provides FERC with the authority to prescribe 
rules that set the boundaries for PURPA implementation throughout the 
nation, FERC’s actual implementation power is limited since PURPA 
reserves discretion to PSCs to determine how FERC’s regulations should 
be implemented in its respective state.20 This reservation of authority is 
particularly important because it essentially results in PSCs having the 
discretion to define what is reasonable and nondiscriminatory in the 
context of developing avoided cost rates and interconnection fees, 
allowing its actions don’t implicate PURPA’s baseline requirements and 
that they are “reasonably designed to give effect to FERC’s rules.”21 
Therefore, while FERC may issue regulations that aim to encourage 
development of QFs, PSCs have the authority over actual binding 
implementation of PURPA and how FERC’s regulations are carried out 
within their respective state. Throughout the U.S., this delegated authority 
means the difference between some PSCs implementing PURPA and 
FERC’s rules to actually expand and encourage development of QFs, and 
some PSCs implementing PURPA on a bare minimum level that arguably 
have the end result of discouraging QF development, contrary to PURPA’s 
most basic purpose of “encouraging” QF development.  
While FERC has generally issued regulations to fulfill PURPA’s 
goal of encouraging QF development, its landmark regulation being Order 
No. 69 in 1982, FERC recently finalized a new rulemaking, Order No. 
872, in July 2020.22 Although Order No. 872 was dubbed by the majority 
Republican commissioners as “modernizing PURPA,”23 its more accurate 
moniker is a “gutting of PURPA.” As FERC Commissioner Richard Glick 
appropriately summarized in his dissent: 
 
I dissent in part from today’s final rule because it 
effectively guts the Commission’s implementation of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). The 
Commission’s basic responsibilities under PURPA are 
 
20. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 751 (1982). 
21. Id.  
22. Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n, Final Order No. 872, FERC (July 16, 
2020), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/07-2020-E-1.pdf. 
23. Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n, FERC Modernizes PURPA Rules to 
Ensure Compliance, Reflect Today’s Markets, FERC (July 16, 2020), https://www. 
ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-modernizes-purpa-rules-ensure-compliance-reflect 
-todays-markets.  
2021 LOCALIZING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE  205 
 
 
three-fold: (1) to encourage the development of 
qualifying facilities (QFs); (2) to prevent discrimination 
against QFs by incumbent utilities; and (3) to ensure that 
the resulting rates paid by electricity customers remain 
just and reasonable, in the public interest, and do not 
exceed the incremental costs to the utility of alternative 
energy. I do not believe that today’s Final Rule satisfies 
those responsibilities. Instead, the Final Rule raises as 
many questions as it answers, not least of which is the 
long-term legal viability of an approach that does so little 
to encourage QF development.24 
 
Indeed, Commissioner Glick’s full dissent summarized each 
aspect of where Order No. 872 violated PURPA by effectively dismantling 
rules that have acted to encourage QF development for decades in favor of 
rules that will undoubtedly discourage their development. Perhaps the 
most egregious action by FERC in Order No. 872 was the elimination of 
the requirement under 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2) that states allow QFs to 
choose between an available or variable rate calculated at the time of 
delivery or a contract option that provides for fixed avoided cost payments 
over a term of years.25 It is a general consensus among QF developers that 
a variable rate is not a financeable rate and most, if not all, QF developers 
choose the fixed rate over a term of years option for its avoided cost 
payments. The easiest way to compare this change is to a home mortgage. 
When presented with a choice of a 30-year or 15-year mortgage, most 
choose 30, and when presented with the option of choosing a variable 
interest rate, most choose a fixed interest rate on their loan due to the 
uncertainty of a variable rate.  
In states where PSCs have been diligently working to kill QF 
development, undoubtedly, they are giddy over the prospects of stripping 
QFs of their ability to have a fixed rate over a term of years. However, 
doing so in certain states where the utility is vertically integrated is likely 
unlawful and contrary to PURPA’s anti-discrimination provision at 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(2). As Commissioner Glick correctly noted, “fixed-
price contracts have helped prevent discrimination against QFs by 
ensuring that they are not structurally disadvantaged relative to vertically 
 
24. Federal Energy Reg. Comm’n, Commissioner Richard Glick Dissent 
in Part Regarding Qualifying Facility Rates and Requirements Implementation Issues 
Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, FERC (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-richard-glick-dissent-part 
-regarding-qualifying-facility-rates-and/ [hereinafter, “Glick Order No. 872 Dissent”]. 
25. Final Order No. 872, 172 FERC ¶ 61,041, ¶ 253. 
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integrated utilities that are guaranteed to recover the costs of their 
prudently incurred investments through retail sales.”26 Vertically 
integrated utilities are those that own and control generation, transmission, 
and distribution components of electricity and are largely utilities 
operating in the southeastern and western United States.27 In other words, 
a PSC’s action of upending fixed price contracts for QFs in states where 
the utility is a vertically integrated utility that receives a guaranteed fixed 
rate of return or cost recovery from its ratepayers—like utilities operating 
in the southeastern and much of the western United States, including 
Montana’s primary utility—would likely be found to be unlawful and 
contrary to PURPA’s anti-discrimination provision on avoided cost rate 
calculations.28 Accordingly, in states where the utility is a vertically 
integrated utility, the state PSCs may want to think twice before they jump 
on the Order No. 872 bandwagon and upending fixed-price contracts.29 
B. The Importance of PURPA Today 
Despite some recent calls to repeal or reform PURPA and FERC’s 
Order No. 872 effective gutting of PURPA, PURPA’s purpose to diversify 
the nation’s energy sources and increase small power production is equally 
relevant today as it was in the 1970s because the need to diversify and 
 
26. Glick Order No. 872 Dissent, supra note 24.  
27. Harvard Electricity Policy Group, Vertically Integrated Utility, 
(2020), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/faq/vertically-integrated-utility; Seth Blumsack, 
Introduction to Electricity Markets: 1.3 Major Players in the Electric Power Sector, 
Penn State University, https://www.e-education.psu.edu/ebf483/node/641. 
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(2); Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 969, 976, 982 
(describing the guaranteed cost-recovery or rate of return of Montana’s major utility 
that is vertically integrated). 
29. Moreover, notwithstanding the likelihood that upending fixed 
contracts for QFs operating in vertically integrated utility territories would be found 
contrary to PURPA, several other factors dictate that jumping on the Order No. 872 
bandwagon may be premature. First, there is ongoing litigation surrounding the 
lawfulness of FERC Order No. 872 itself that could result in setting aside the entirety 
of Order No. 872. See Montana Env. Info. Ctr. et. al v. FERC, Case No. 21-70083 
(Filed Jan. 14, 2021, Ninth Cir.); SEIA v. FERC, Case No. 20-72788 (Filed Sept. 18, 
2020, 9th Cir.). Second, it is possible that when the majority on FERC shifts from a 
3–2 Republican majority to a 3–2 Democratic majority in June 2021, Order No. 872 
could be either rescinded or effectively nullified. See Bracewell LLP, Things Looking 
Up for Renewable Resources at Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Feb. 10, 
2021), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6502f1f7-35fe-4745-b18b 
-41cd4c243589; Sidley Austin LLP, What a Biden Administration Means for the 
Energy Sector (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g= 
36838566-ce16-4ef9-bb64-7d9f169f4044.  
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decentralize the nation’s power sources still exists. With the help of 
PURPA, production and consumption of clean energy has increased 
significantly in the last ten years in the United States, exceeding coal 
consumption.30 While PURPA QF projects comprise a smaller annual 
percentage of overall renewable energy development across the United 
States (between ten to 40 percent, depending on the year), the cumulative 
gigawatt capacity of PURPA QF projects has more than doubled in the last 
decade.31 Importantly, in certain states (it appears largely those states 
where the operating utility is vertically integrated), PURPA QF projects 
comprise a significant percentage of new wind and solar development, 
including North Carolina where 92 percent of all solar generation is QF 
certified32 and Montana where close to 50 percent of wind and solar 
projects are QFs.33  
In other words, clearly PURPA remains an important and relevant 
law today in the United States, particularly in states where the monopoly 
utility, sometimes with the help of the state utility commission, continues 
to impose excessive and unlawful barriers to renewable energy 
development by independent power producers resulting in QFs failing to 
have nondiscriminatory access to the market.34 Even with PURPA’s goal 
 
30. EIA, U.S. renewable energy consumption surpasses first time in over 
130 years, (May 28, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895. 
31.  EIA, North Carolina has more PURPA-qualifying solar facilities 






33. As provided in the following citations, Montana has around 364 MWs 
of QF generation and a capacity of around 800 MWs, resulting in a QF percentage of 
about 46 percent of wind and solar resource generation in Montana. See National 
Regulatory Research Institute, PURPA Tracker, NARUC (2021), 
https://www.naruc.org/nrri/nrri-activities/purpa-tracker; see also EIA, Montana: State 
Profile and Energy Estimates (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/state/ 
analysis.php?sid=MT#117.  
34. One reason for a decline in overall number of PURPA projects is that 
in 2005, Congress enacted an amendment to PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 8241-3(m) that 
exempted electric utilities who operate in an independent market that is administered 
by an independent body (i.e. Independent System Operators or “ISOs”) from 
PURPA’s mandatory purchase obligations, meaning those utility’s whose operations 
are not vertically integrated. Vertically integrated utilities have a monopoly on market 
access and via restrictive actions cane effectively limit independent power producers’ 
access to the market in their territory, which emphasizes the continued relevance and 
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of breaking down barriers imposed by monopoly utilities so as to ensure 
an open market exists in the power generation sector, non-discriminatory 
access to the monopoly utility markets remains challenging.  
Moreover, notwithstanding the progress of renewable energy 
generation with the help of PURPA, the Nation still continues to be heavily 
reliant on fossil fuels.35 As of 2017, fossil fuels (namely coal and natural 
gas) comprise about sixty-three percent of the total share of United States 
electricity generation, nuclear makes up 20 percent, and renewables 
(including hydropower) total only around 17 percent.36 Accordingly, 
overreliance on centralized power and fossil fuels still plagues the country 
as the overdependence on fossil fuels leads to increases in the risk of price 
volatility of electricity,37 climate change impacts,38 public health 
consequences,39 expensive weather and climate disasters that disrupt 
centralized power,40 in addition to national security implications.41 
Therefore, PURPA is still highly relevant today as it clearly continues to 
be needed to help decrease the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels through 
 
importance of PURPA today. See Advanced Energy Economy, How Much Do You 
Know About Your Electric Utility (Feb. 17, 2015), https://blog.aee.net/how-much-do 
-you-know-about-your-electric-utility#:~:text=The%20traditional%20definition%20 
of%20a,production%20and%20sale%20of%20power. 
35. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Table 10: Renewable Energy Production 
and Consumption by Source, EIA.GOV (Apr. 2018), https://www.eia.gov/ 
totalenergy/data/monthly/ pdf/sec10_3.pdf. 
36. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., What is U.S. Electricity Generation by 
Source, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited Nov. 
17, 2020). 
37. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas: Henry Hub Natural Gas 
Spot Price, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm (last updated May 
2, 2018); Jeff Deyette, et. al., The Natural Gas Gamble: A Risky Bet on America’s 
Clean Energy Future, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 12–15 (2015), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/natural-gas-gamble-full 
-report.pdf; Elena M. Krieger, Low fossil fuel prices embody their inherently risky 
volatility, THE HILL (2015), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy 
-environment/233006-low-fossil-fuel-prices-embody-their-inherently-risky.  
38. Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab, Energy Analysis: Life Cycle 
Assessment Harmonization, NREL, https://www.nrel.gov/analysis/life-cycle 
-assessment.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).  
39. Deyette, supra note 37, at 17–18. 
40. Daniel Shea, State Efforts to Protect the Electric Grid, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2–3 (2016), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/ 
Documents/energy/ENERGY_SECURITY_REPORT_FINAL_April2016.pdf. 
41. American Council on Renewable Energy, The Role of Renewable 
Energy in National Security (Oct. 2018), https://acore.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
10/ACORE_Issue-Brief-The-Role-of-Renewable-Energy-in-National-Security.pdf. 
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encouraging the development of diverse and decentralized small power 
production systems. 
C. Avoided Costs Requirements of PURPA 
 To encourage development of QFs, PURPA requires that any 
costs paid to a QF for electricity generated are equitable, non-
discriminatory, and are based on the utility’s “full avoided cost.”42 
Avoided costs and the contract terms locking in those costs for a period of 
years is similar to a utility’s guaranteed rate of return or cost recovery.43 
There are two options for developing equitable and non-discriminatory 
rates: (1) negotiation between the utility and the QF, which is typically the 
route for larger sized QFs; or (2) standardized avoided costs set by PSCs.44 
FERC defines “avoided costs” as the “incremental cost to an electric utility 
of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the 
QF, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another source.”45 
Energy avoided costs are the cost savings delivered to the utility by the QF 
as a result of the QF reducing the amount of energy needing to be 
generated at the utility’s more expensive power plants.46 Capacity avoided 
costs occur when a utility is reaching maximum load demand for its 
current energy supply throughout its territory and the utility needs 
additional power to meet demand, but building a new centralized power 
plant would be excessive; thus, the incremental energy that a QF can 
provide enables the utility to defer construction of a new power plant 
and/or minimize the need for spot-market purchases.47  
 Standardized avoided costs are set by the PSCs and are required 
for QFs 100 kilowatts (kWs) or less, but PSCs have discretion to apply a 
standardized avoided cost rate for QFs as large as 80 MWs.48 The 
application of standard avoided cost rates vary by state, with some PSCs 
 
42. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2005); Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. 
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 402 (1983). 
43. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 982. 
44. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a), (m)(6); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c), (d); Am. 
Paper Inst., Inc., 461 U.S. at 402 (holding that FERC’s action requiring that the utility 
must purchase energy from a QF at the full avoided cost was lawful); S. Cal. Edison, 
71 FERC at 62080. 
45. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6). 
46  Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, Avoided Cost, IEPA, 
https://www.iepa.com/glossary-of-energy-terms/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
47. Id. 
48. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.204(a), 304(c); FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 
12,214-02, 12,223. 
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applying standardized avoided cost rates to ten MWs, such as in Oregon,49 
and others only the minimum of 100 kW.50 Standardized avoided cost rates 
are important to smaller QFs (i.e. 20 MWs or less) because the 
transactional costs of negotiating rates with the utility could alone render 
the small QF uneconomical.51 In calculating standardized avoided costs, 
FERC has ordered that avoided cost rates should be set at the utilities full 
avoided cost—nothing less, nothing more—an order that has been upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court.52 Overall, the standardized avoided 
cost component of § 210 of PURPA is critical to diversifying and 
decentralizing the Nation’s energy sources, but its impact varies by state 
according to the QF size that the standardized rate applies to and the 
avoided cost calculation methodology chosen by the PSC.  
In calculating avoided costs, FERC provides mandatory and 
discretionary guidance to PSCs. According to FERC, there are several 
factors that must be taken into account in determining a QF’s avoided cost 
rates, including, but not limited to: (1) the usefulness of the QF’s energy 
during a system emergency, including its ability to separate its load and 
generation; (2) the “individual and aggregate value of energy and capacity 
from QFs” to the utility’s system; (3) the QF’s smaller capacity increments 
and shorter lead times, which is the time it takes to make, produce, or 
deliver energy; (4) the QF’s ability to enable the utility to defer capacity 
additions and decrease reliance on fossil fuels; and (5) the utility cost 
savings resulting from decreased line losses of energy during transmission 
from the QF.53  
In addition to these mandatory factors, in 1995 FERC ruled that 
environmental costs of fuels should be accounted for in determining the 
utilities avoided cost if the costs are real costs that would be incurred by 
the utility since those costs are an aspect of the utility’s full avoided 
 
49. OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, In the Matter of Public Utility Commission 
Of Oregon Staff’s Investigation Relating to Electric Utility Purchases from Qualifying 
Facilities, Order No. 05-584, 1 (May 13, 2005), http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/ 
2005ords/05-584.pdf (Oregon established a 10 MW threshold for standardized 
avoided costs). 
50. Utility Dive, Michigan regulators set new avoided cost rate for 
PURPA contracts, (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/Michigan 
-regulators-set-new-avoided-cost-rate-for-purpa-contracts/511639/ (Standardized 
avoided cost rates in Michigan used to only apply to 100 kW projects prior to a 
November 2017 Michigan Public Service Commission order.). 
51. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. at 12,223. 
52. Id.; Am. Paper Inst., Inc., 461 U.S. at 402 (holding that FERC’s order 
requiring utilities to purchase energy from QFs at their full avoided cost was lawful 
under PURPA). 
53. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2020).  
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costs.54 Further, in 2010, FERC held that states may set resource specific 
avoided cost rates, meaning the rate may be based on the resource being 
proposed by the QF (wind, solar, etc.), rather than other energy sources 
(coal, gas, etc.) within the utility’s energy mix.55  
1. Types of Avoided Cost Methodologies 
 In calculating avoided costs, PSCs rely on various methods that 
typically always elicit significant debate and argument among regulated 
parties. Those methodologies primarily include: 
 
(a)  Proxy Method: Bases avoided costs on the projected costs 
that the utility would incur from building a hypothetical 
power plant, and the amount depends on the cost of the 
chosen proxy plant. The avoided cost is based on the fixed 
and variable costs of the proxy unit’s generation that the 
QF allows the utility to avoid;  
(b)  Peaker Unit Method: Similar to the proxy method but 
assumes that the QF is allowing the utility to avoid paying 
for a “marginal generating unit on its system,” meaning a 
unit that is able to ramp up and down quickly and only 
operates during times that the utility’s load is above its 
baseload power production. This methodology is known 
to generally undercompensate QFs since while its 
variable costs are high (i.e. each time the facility has to 
ramp up in response to load spikes), its capital costs are 
low (i.e. the costs of running the facility itself, paying for 
fuel, maintenance, etc., which is lower since the facility is 
only operational on an inconsistent basis);  
 
54. S. Cal. Edison Co. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61,269, 
62,080 (F.E.R.C. June 2, 1995); see also Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n.; S. Cal. Edison Co. 
P. Gas and Electric Co. San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,268 
(FERC Oct. 21, 2010). 
55. CPUC, 71 FERC at 61,267–68; Carolyn Elefant, Reviving PURPA’s 
Purpose: The Limits of Existing State Avoided Cost Ratemaking Methodologies In 
Supporting Alternative Energy Development and A Proposed Path for Reform, 2 
(2011), http://www.recycled-energy.com/images/uploads/Reviving-PURPA.pdf. 
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(c)  Differential Revenue Requirement: Calculates the 
difference in the utility’s revenue requirements56 with and 
without the QF and bases the avoided cost on that 
calculation. The avoided energy and capacity costs are 
estimated together rather than separately as is done in the 
proxy methodology; 
(d) Integrated Resource Planning-Based Methodology: 
Combined with one of the above methodologies, utilities 
base generation mix goals on an IRP; 
(e)  Competitive Bidding: Open bidding process where the 
winning bid is regarded as the avoided cost;  
(f)  Market-Based Pricing: Applies to QFs with access to 
organized competitive markets (i.e. markets ran by 
Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent 
System Operators, not a monopoly utility) and the QF 
receives the avoided cost payments at market rates.57 
2. Contract Terms of QF Power Purchase Agreements 
In addition to delegating significant authority to PSCs to develop 
avoided cost calculations, PURPA also delegates to PSCs the 
determination of terms and conditions of the power purchase agreements 
(“PPAs”) between the QF and the utility. However, PURPA and FERC 
 
56. Revenue requirements are the total costs of the utility of meeting its 
specified demand/load plus a rate of return or profit. See National Regulatory Research 
Institute, The Appropriateness and Feasibility of Various methods of Calculating 
Avoided Costs, 95 n.17 (1982), https://ipu.msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ 
NRRI-Appropriatness-Feasibility-June-82-1.pdf. 
57. Carolyn Elefant, Reviving PURPA’s Purpose: The Limits of Existing 
State Avoided Cost Ratemaking Methodologies In Supporting Alternative Energy 
Development and A Proposed Path for Reform, 26–27 (2011), http://www.recycled-
energy.com/images/uploads/Reviving-PURPA.pdf; Victor B. Flatt, et al., Federal 
Parameters on the Definition of Avoided Cost Under PURPA and Legal Methods 
Currently Used and Acceptable Under PURPA Application for States to Encourage 
or Discourage Distributed Generation, UNC CENTER FOR CLIMATE, ENERGY, 
ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY & 
NATURAL RESOURCES CENTER, 17–23 (July 1, 2017), https://www.law.uh.edu/ 
eenrcenter/resources/whitepapers/Federal%20Parameters%20on%20State%20Distri
buted %20Generation.pdf. 
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regulations provide necessary sideboards.58 While PSCs have authority 
over contract lengths, PURPA’s plain language, FERC regulations, and 
orders by various PSCs provide some guidance on necessary lengths of 
contracts that are needed to encourage QF development so as to allow for 
return on investment. First, PURPA requires that PSCs enact rules that are 
necessary to encourage production from QFs.59 Arguably, short contract 
lengths fail to encourage QF power production and result in projects not 
being built since short-term contracts are largely unfinanceable.60 
Moreover, PURPA’s anti-discrimination provision, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-
3(b)(2), arguably provides a sideboard on contract lengths ordered by 
PSCs since many utility owned resources, such as the major utility 
operating in Montana, “enjoy a guaranteed cost-recovery or rate of return, 
which is functionally equivalent to a contract, for at least 25 years.”61 
Treating QF projects different than utility owned resources raises the issue 
of discriminatory treatment against QFs and preferential treatment for 
utility-owned resources by PSCs.62  
In reviewing the issue of contract lengths, the Michigan Public 
Service Commission recently concluded contract lengths should extend to 
a minimum of 20 years to be consistent with PURPA, as this allows the 
QF improved access to finances and investment.63 Pre-Order No. 872, 
 
58. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(iii); Indep. Energy Producers v. Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 36 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the state may consider 
contract lengths and terms in calculating avoided cost rates). 
59. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3. 
60. Dr. Jurgen Weiss and Dr. Mark Sarro, The Importance of Long-term 
Contracting for Facilitating Renewable Energy Project Development, THE BRATTLE 
GROUP, 18–19 (May 7, 2013), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/View 
Doc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B530BEAA7-6E02-4256-BBA3-04AB7EB7831B%7D; 
Robert Walton, BNEF: Shorter contracts could put PURPA solar projects at financial 
risk, UTILITY DIVE (Nov. 29, 2016) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/bnef-shorter 
-contracts-could-put-purpa-solar-projects-at-financial-risk/431232/. 
61. Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 982. 
62. Indeed, at the time of drafting this article, amendments to PURPA 
were under consideration in Congress, including an amendment to 16 U.S.C. § 824a-
3 that explicitly provides: “The Commission [FERC] shall require that qualifying 
facilities have the option to enter a fixed price contract whose term is at least as long 
as the term on which the incumbent utility recovers invests in new generation[.]” 
CLEAN Future Act, H.R. ____, 117th Cong. § 224 (2021). Such an amendment would 
not only put an end to the debate on exactly how long a long-term contract is, but 
would also effectively put the nullify FERC Order No. 872’s action of gutting fixed 
contracts.  
63. MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, In the matter on the Commission’s own 
motion establishing the method and avoided cost calculation for Consumers Energy 
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FERC also agreed that long-term contracts are necessary to encourage QF 
production, as FERC found that they provide for certainty in regard to 
return on investment and they allow for any overestimations or 
underestimations of avoided costs to “balance out” over time.64 By 
ensuring avoided cost payments over a long-term contract, QFs are 
provided with a “certainty of an arrangement” that provides stability to the 
contract and attracts investors since the QF’s rate of return does not 
undergo variations due to changed circumstances,65 such as short-term 
fluctuations in the market cost of electricity. Further, long-term contracts 
may also benefit the utility should avoided costs turn out to be higher than 
those decided on in the contract.66  
Overall, the length of the PPA contract between the QF and the 
electric utility is an important factor in encouraging development of QFs 
and is critical to securing financing for project development. The longer 
the contract,67 the greater benefits to QF development prospects via 
improved return on investment certainty and increased capital investor 
 
Company to fully comply with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., Case No. U-18090, 21–22 (May 31, 2017), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/u-18090_5_31_2017_579172_7.pdf. 
64. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214-02, 12,224 (Feb. 25, 1980). 
65. Id. 
66. Id.; see also Conn. Valley Elec. Co., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Claremont 
Co., L.P., 82 FERC ¶ 61,116, 61,419–20 (1998), denying reconsideration and reh’g 
and granting clarification, 83 FERC ¶ 61,136, aff’d sub nom; Conn. Valley Elec. Co. 
v. FERC, 208 F.3d 1037 (2000) (ruling that modification of contracts between QFs 
and utilities in the event a party claims the economic assumptions changed is 
unacceptable). 
67. Long-term contracts are typically defined as those PPAs that are 15–
30 years long , with an apparent general agreement among the renewable energy 
community that 20-years or greater (depending on financial and developmental 
circumstances) is typically required for renewable energy projects to achieve 
adequate return on investment so as to provide for sufficient certainty for capital 
investors and allow for actual project development.. See David Feldman, Mark 
Bolinger, and Paul Schwabe, Current and Future Costs of Renewable Energy Project 
Finance Across Technologies, NREL, 2 (July 2020), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/ 
76881.pdf; M. Bolinger and J. Steel, Utility-Scale Solar, Empirical Trends in Project 
Technology, Cost, Performance, and PPA pricing in the United States – 2018 Edition, 
LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, 31 n.39 (Sept. 2018), 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt5rc3j8cj/qt5rc3j8cj.pdf; U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 2018 Wind Technologies Market 
Report, 58 n.64 (Aug. 2019), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/ 
2018%20Wind%20Technologies%20Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. 
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interest.68 Indeed, long-term PPAs (i.e. 20-years or longer depending on 
development circumstances) are critical to the encouragement of QF 
development since a “significant portion of current financial risk to 
renewable energy generation plants is mitigated by long-term, fixed 
contracts.”69 Long-term contracts have been identified as “the most 
important factor that can provide [investor] confidence” and allow for 
project development.70 Importantly, while the price volatility of fossil fuel-
based generation puts ratepayers at risk in long-term PPAs, renewable 
energy projects “have little to no fuel risks,” as opposed to fossil fuel-
based resources, “and are able to contract electricity for much longer 
periods—typically 10-30 years” with minimal risk to ratepayers since the 
costs of renewable energy generation generally remain stable throughout 
the life of the contract.71 
Contrary to long-term contracts, shorter contract lengths72 provide 
less price certainty for renewable energy projects and increase risk for a 
given project’s lenders and investors, ultimately increasing the cost of 
capital for a given project and discouraging QF development.73 Indeed, 
since renewable energy projects have high upfront costs, short-term 
contracts present many financing challenges. Specifically, short-term 
 
68. Weiss, supra note 60; see also David Feldman and Paul Schwabe, 
Terms, Trends, and Insights: PV Project Finance in the United States 2017, NREL, 5 
(Sept. 2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/70157.pdf; see also Chris Groobey, 
et. al., Project Finance Primer for Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Projects, 
WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI, 2 (Aug. 2010), https://www.wsgr.com/ 
PDFSearch/ctp_guide.pdf. 
69. David Feldman, Mark Bolinger, and Paul Schwabe, Current and 
Future Costs of Renewable Energy Project Finance Across Technologies, NREL, 30 
(July 2020), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy20osti/76881.pdf; see also Developers can cut 
costs of renewable energy ‘if offered longer contracts and long-term visibility,’ 
RECHARGE NEWS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.rechargenews.com/wind/ 
developers-can-cut-cost-of-renewable-energy-if-offered-longer-contracts-and-long 
-term-visibility/2-1-922568 (indicating that a minimum of a 20-year PPA, rather than 
15-year, is necessary to minimize risk and costs related to renewable energy 
development). 
70. Weiss, supra note 60, at 18–19 (emphasis added). 
71. Feldman et. al, supra note 69, at 8. 
72. Short-term PPA lengths depend on the ultimate avoided cost amount 
paid to the developer but appear to generally be viewed as contract lengths less than 
15 years. See U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable 
Energy, 2018 Wind Technologies Market Report, 58 n.64 (Aug. 2019), https://www. 
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/2018%20Wind%20Technologies%20Market
%20Report%20FINAL.pdf (finding that 89% of contracts in the empirical analysis 
were for terms ranging from 15 to 25 years). 
73. Weiss, supra note 60, at 3, 9, 11–12.  
216               PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 44 
 
 
contracts result in increasing the “degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
revenue stream” and “impacts the amount of debt financing it can attract 
and the cost of attracting debt financing.”74 Accordingly, without 
“obtaining a long-term PPA with some level of revenue assurance based 
on power production, a renewable energy project (all else equal) will 
attract less and more costly debt and more costly equity than traditional 
power project operating in the same wholesale power market” resulting in 
a riskier investment and, ultimately, a decreased probability that the 
project will be built.75  
While the debate over what exactly is a “long-term” contract 
continues in PSC proceedings around the nation, empirical analyses 
indicate—consistent with the Michigan PSC’s finding discussed above—
that generally a minimum of 20 years, depending on the avoided cost 
price and other developmental circumstances, is an appropriate length 
to allow for development. An empirical analysis of PPAs in the United 
States for utility-scale solar projects found that the mean PPA term is 22.5 
years.76 Likewise, an empirical analysis in 2018 for utility-scale wind 
projects found that contract terms range from five to 35 years, with 89% 
of sampled contracts having terms ranging from 15 to 25 years,  a 
majority of the sampled projects having a PPA length of at least 20 years, 
and an average length for wind projects in the Interior U.S. region 
being 23.5 years.77 In other words, actual data from empirical analyses 
appear to support the notion that a contract term of at least 20 years is 
generally required for wind and solar QFs to be able to achieve a return on 
investment and encourage project development consistent with PURPA’s 
mandate at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) require QF development be encouraged. 
3. The Legally Enforceable Obligation 
Among the regulations adopted by FERC in implementing 
PURPA is 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d), which gives QFs the right to choose 
 
74. Id.  
75. Id.  
76. M. Bolinger and J. Steel, Utility-Scale Solar, Empirical Trends in 
Project Technology, Cost, Performance, and PPA pricing in the United States – 2018 
Edition, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, at 31 n.39 (Sept. 2018), 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt5rc3j8cj/qt5rc3j8cj.pdf; see also Weiss, supra note 
60, at 17 n.39 (assuming 20 years to be a long-term contract). 
77. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency & 
Renewable Energy, 2018 Wind Technologies Market Report, 58 n.64, 60 (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/08/f65/2018%20Wind%20Technologi
es%20Market%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.  
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whether to sell their power on an “as available” basis with rates calculated 
at the time of delivery or pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation 
(“LEO”). A LEO is a "non-contractual, but binding commitment from a 
QF to sell power to a utility.”78 The LEO concept was developed to 
overcome the barrier of utility reluctance to purchase power from QFs as 
it is “used to prevent an electric utility from avoiding its PURPA 
obligations by refusing to sign a contract, or “from delaying the signing of 
a contract, so that a later and lower avoided cost is applicable.”79  
Acknowledging the power imbalance between utilities and small 
power producers, FERC has made it clear that a LEO is different from a 
contract and the “phrase is used to prevent an electric utility from avoiding 
its PURPA obligations by refusing to sign a contract, or ‘from delaying 
the signing of a contract, so that a later and lower avoided cost is 
applicable.’”80 As held by FERC in a 2006 decision, “[t]hat Congress used 
the term ‘contract or obligation’ in drafting section 210(m)(6) suggests 
that Congress intended that the Commission continue to protect both 
contracts and obligations that had not yet ripened into contracts but were 
‘in effect or pending approval.’”81 
This concept has been a common thread in FERC declaratory 
orders regarding different state commissions’ LEO rules. As a general 
rule, FERC has rejected tests that create barriers to entry for QFs and that 
place the control of LEO formation in the control of the utilities.82 
Importantly, “‘the establishment of a LEO turns on ‘the QF's commitment, 
and not the utility's actions,’ and when a QF commits itself to sell to an 
electric utility, it ‘also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF.'”83  
While this concept can be a bit murky, particular given a lawyer's 
legal training in contracts (i.e. offer, acceptance, consideration), at bottom 
the LEO concept is meant to aid QFs in their development path by 
allowing the QF to move forward with reasonable certainty as to its return 
on investment since the formation of a LEO results in locking in place the 
various factors relevant to total avoided cost calculations based on the date 
of the LEO regardless of a monopoly utility’s refusal to negotiate or 
 
78. Id. at ¶ 6 (citing Cedar Creek Wind, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,006, 61,023 
(Oct. 4, 2011). 
79. Id. (citing Cedar Creek Wind, 137 FERC at 61,024). 
80. MTSUN, ¶ 6 (citing Cedar Creek Wind, LLC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,006, 
61,024 (Oct. 4, 2011)).  
81. Midwest Renewable Energy Projects, LLC, 116 FERC ¶ 61,017, 
61,073 (2006). 
82. MTSUN, ¶ 66. 
83. Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis in original) (citing FLS Energy, Inc., 157 FERC 
¶ 61,211, 61,730–31 (2016)).  
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stonewalling of the QF.84 While the LEO concept is important for larger 
QFs, the concept is generally not applicable to smaller QFs that are entitled 
to a standardized avoided cost since the purpose of having a standardized 
avoided cost rate is to negate the need of small QFs to negotiate with the 
utility and minimize transactional costs.85 
4. Consideration of the Public Interest in Setting Avoided Cost Rates 
 PURPA specifically states that avoided cost rates “shall be just 
and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric utility and in the 
public interest.”86 In accounting for the public interest in setting avoided 
cost rates, the definition of public interest must be read in the context of 
PURPA’s purpose.87 PURPA declares that “the business of transmitting 
and selling electric energy for the ultimate distribution to the public is 
affected with a public interest.”88 Where statutes use the words “public 
interest,” the Supreme Court has ruled that the meaning of public interest 
in the statute is directly related to the purpose of the legislation.89 In 
considering the public interest in PURPA, PURPA’s purpose encompasses 
not only economic interests, such as the cost of electricity to the ratepayer, 
but also electricity grid reliability and environmental interests associated 
with the financial and public health impacts related to overreliance on 
fossil fuel based electricity sources.  
 Precedent in the Supreme Court, D.C. Circuit, and FERC orders 
dictates that the words “public interest” in PURPA allow for consideration 
beyond simply economic interests and that they also encompass 
environmental and public health and welfare interests in setting avoided 
 
84. While FERC Order No. 872, as discussed above effectively guts 
PURPA, one positive aspect of the Order was that it provided further clarification on 
when a QF establishes a LEO. Specifically, it provided that a QF establishes a LEO 
when it demonstrates its commercial viability and financial commitment to developing 
the project. See FERC Order No. 872, 172 FERC ¶ 61,041, ¶ 684. FERC left states 
with the flexibility to determine the criteria for demonstrating commercial viability 
and financial commitment (as long as the criteria is “objective and reasonable”), but 
provided examples of objective and reasonable criteria, including that the QF has: (1) 
taken meaningful steps to obtain site control of the project; (2) filed an interconnection 
application with the utility; and (3) has applied for required permitting. See FERC 
Order No. 872, ¶ 685. FERC reiterated that “the factors that the state requires must be 
factors that are within the control of the QF.” FERC Order No. 872, ¶ 685. 
85. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. at 12,223.  
86. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
87. Natl. Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n., 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976). 
88. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2005). 
89. Fed. Power Comm’n., 425 U.S. at 669. 
2021 LOCALIZING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE  219 
 
 
costs. In FERC v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court noted that part of 
PURPA’s purpose was to protect the “public health, safety, and welfare” 
and “preserve national security.”90 Additionally, in American Paper 
Institute, Inc. v. American Elec. Power Service Corp., the Supreme Court 
held that it was in the public’s interest to increase electricity production 
from QFs, regardless of the fact it didn’t provide ratepayer cost savings, 
because “the entire country will ultimately benefit” from QF energy and 
the resulting decreased reliance on fossil fuels.91 Arguably in ensuring that 
rates for QFs are set in the “public interest,” it is incumbent on PSCs to 
not merely consider economic costs that QFs avoid, but also broader 
societal costs that are related to fossil fuel-based electricity.92  
III. PURPA’S ROLE IN BOOSTING LOCAL CLEAN ENERGY PROJECTS 
As demand for clean energy increases, providing avenues for 
development of local community-scale projects, and not only large-scale 
rural projects, is an important step towards achieving localized energy 
independence. PURPA already plays a critical role in boosting clean 
energy projects, however, and through proper implementation of PURPA, 
the full benefits of local clean energy projects can result in higher avoided 
costs that represent a given utility’s true full avoided cost. Local clean 
energy projects, also known as distributed generation (“DG”) systems, 
include technologies such as solar panels and wind turbines that generate 
electricity on-site or near where the energy is consumed, and range from 
less than 100 kWs to ten MWs.93 DG systems can serve residential, 
 
90. 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1982). 
91. 461 U.S. 402, 417 (1983). 
92. In relation to electricity production and environmental costs, it is a 
well-known fact that the burning of fossil fuels endangers public health, safety, and 
welfare due to its contributions to climate change, as well as air pollution. 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 FR 66496–501 (2009) (upheld in Coalition for 
Responsible Reg., Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Moreover, climate 
change has severe impacts on national security. See Department of Defense, Report 
on the Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense (Jan. 2019), 
https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_ 
effects_of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf; see also The White House, The National 
Security Implications of A Changing Climate (May 2015), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/National_Security_Implications_of_Changing_
Climate_Final_051915.pdf.  
93. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Distributed Generation of Electricity and 
its Environmental Impacts, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation 
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commercial, or industrial facilities on-site or can be off-site, as long as the 
DG system is still only connected to the grid on the distribution level and 
not the transmission level.94 Through smart implementation of avoided 
cost methodologies by state utility commissions—coupled with long-term 
contracts of 20-years or longer depending on developmental 
circumstances, as discussed above—the development of local community-
scale DG projects throughout the country can be further enhanced, helping 
communities realize localized energy independence along with its many 
benefits including increased grid reliability and resiliency.  
A. Defining How PSCs Should Set Avoided Cost Ratemaking  
Methodologies to Encourage DG Projects 
Using avoided cost ratemaking methodologies, PSCs have the 
power to enable wide-scale development of community-scale DG projects. 
While PURPA and FERC regulations allow for consideration of several 
factors that are relevant to encouraging DG projects, PSCs around the 
nation fail to consistently apply those factors in developing standardized 
avoided cost rates.95 Overall, DG systems provide significant benefits to 
the electric grid, utilities, and the public, specifically through avoided line 
 
-electricity-and-its-environmental-impacts (last visited Nov. 17, 2020); Nat’l 
Renewable Energy Lab., Energy Analysis: Distributed Generation Renewable Energy 
Estimate of Costs, NREL, https://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech-lcoe-re-cost-est.html 
(last updated Feb. 2016); Mahesh Kumar et. al., Optimal Placement and Sizing of 
Renewable Distributed Generations and Capacitor Banks into Radial Distribution 
Systems, Energies, 16 (see Table 7) (June 14, 2017), http://www.mdpi.com/1996 
-1073/10/6/811/pdf-vor. 
94. N.Y. State Energy Research and Dev. Auth., Summary of Value of 
Distributed Energy Resources, NYSERDA, https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/ 
NYSun/files/VDER-Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2020). 
95. Many PSCs around the nation arguably purposefully use 
methodologies to discourage QF development, such as in Montana where a 
commissioner was overheard discussing tactics on how to derail QF development in 
the state. See Tom Lutey, Hot Mic Records Troubling Conversation About Solar 
Regulations, BILLINGS GAZETTE (June 27, 2017), http://billingsgazette.com/news/ 
government-and-politics/hot-mic-records-troubling-conversation-about-solar 
-regulations/article_8499a49d-e281-5dd7-aae7-aecccfa0394e.html (Commissioner 
Lake was caught saying, in relation to a Montana Public Service Commission order 
dropping contract lengths and avoided cost for QF systems, that “the 10-year might 
do it, if the price doesn’t. And at this low price I can’t imagine anyone getting into 
it.”). Indeed, in a rejection of the Montana PSC’s attempts to circumvent PURPA, the 
Supreme Court of Montana, in an appeal of the Montana PSC’s decision, held that 
“the PSC cannot adopt a new methodology simply to circumvent PURPA’s objective 
to encourage alternative energy development of small power production facilities.” 
Vote Solar, 473 P.3d at 981. 
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losses, decreased transmission and distribution costs, shorter lead times, 
increased reliability, avoidance of volatile price fluctuations inherent in 
fossil fuels, and environmental and public health interests.96 Due to how 
some PSCs structure their avoided cost calculations, however, DG 
developers are not compensated for the benefits they provide to the utilities 
and are not receiving the full avoided cost they are entitled to under 
PURPA. All of the benefits that DG projects provide to utilities must be 
incorporated in avoided cost calculations and it is only just and reasonable 
that PSCs incorporate them in their calculations in order to comply with 
PURPA’s mandate.  
Methods for incorporating DG-specific benefits into avoided cost 
calculations have already been developed. For example, the National 
Renewable Energy Lab (“NREL”) of the United States Department of 
Energy has already developed some methods for quantifying the benefits 
of DG systems.97 Likewise, Michigan’s Public Service Commission has 
developed methods to quantify DG benefits.98 Below are some, but not all, 
of the factors that should be quantified and applied by PSCs in developing 
standardized avoided cost rates for DG projects. 
1. Avoided Line Losses, Reduced Congestion, and  
Decreased Transmission and Distribution Costs 
Since DG systems are located near where the power is used, 
avoided line losses, reduced transmission line congestion, and decreased 
transmission and distribution costs should be accounted for in avoided cost 
 
96. See Amory B. Lovins, et. al., Small is Profitable: The Hidden 
Economic Benefits of Making Electrical Resources the Right Size, Rocky Mountain 
Institute (2002), https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/RMI_Document_ 
Repository_Public-Reprts_U02-09_SmallIsProfitableBook.pdf; U.S. Dept. of Energy, 
The Potential Benefits of Distributed Generation and Rate-Related Issues That May 
Impede Their Expansion, FERC.GOV, 3–18 (Feb. 2007), https://www.energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/1817_Report_-final.pdf [hereinafter Potential 
Benefits Report]. 
97. See Paul Denholm, et. al., Methods for Analyzing the Benefits and 
Costs of Distributed Photovoltaic Generation to the U.S. Electric Utility System, 
NREL (Sept. 2014), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/62447.pdf. 
98.  See MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, Report on the MPSC Staff Study to 
Develop a Cost of Service-Based Distribution Generation Program Tariff (Feb. 21, 
2018), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/MPSC_Staff_DG_Report_ 
with_Appendices_614779_7.pdf. 
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calculations.99 On average, utilities lose about five percent of their power 
due to line losses,100 and FERC has already specified that avoided costs 
should be increased when the utility saves money through reduced line 
losses as a result of a QF being constructed close to consumption.101 
Avoidance of line losses could save utilities a substantial sum of money 
annually. For example, Montana, a state that primarily relies on centralized 
power, lost around 830,779 MW hours in 2019, which is equivalent to the 
annual energy used by about 78,000 homes.102 Minnesota, another state 
heavily dependent on centralized power, lost the around 3.63 million MW 
hours in 2019, the equivalent energy of about 341,000 homes in 2016.103  
Unfortunately for ratepayers, the utility shifts the costs of line 
losses onto its customers, meaning ratepayers are paying for power that 
they do not consume.104 DG projects minimize line losses and ultimately 
deliver more power to consumers with less costs compared to centralized 
 
99. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(iv) (2020); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(ii)(G) 
(2020); Keyes, Fox, & Wiedman LLP, Unlocking DG Value: A PURPA-based 
Approach to Promoting DG Growth, Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc., 5 
(May 2013), https://irecusa.org/publications/unlocking-dg-value-a-purpa-based 
-approach-to-promoting-dg-growth/. 
100. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions: How much 
electricity is lost in transmission and distribution in the United States, EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=105&t=3 (last updated Jan. 29, 2018). 
101. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,227 (Feb. 25, 1980) 
(holding that “[i]f the load served by the [QF] is closer to the [QF] than it is to the 
utility, it is possible that there may be net savings resulting from reduced line losses. 
In such cases, the rates should be adjusted upwards.”); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(4) 
(2018). 
102. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electricity Profiles: Montana 
Electricity Profile 2019, EIA, Table 10, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/montana/ 
index.php (last updated Jan. 25, 2018). The calculation is based on using EIA data that 
the average home consumes 10,649 kWs annually. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does An American Home Use, EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Oct. 9, 2020). 
103. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electricity Profiles: Minnesota 
Electricity Profile 2019, EIA, Table 10, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/minnesota/ 
index.php (last updated Jan. 25, 2018) (Calculation is based on using EIA data that the 
average home consumes 10,649 kWs annually.). See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Electricity Does An American Home Use, EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Oct. 9, 2020).  
104. Constellation-An Edison Company, Line Losses: Overlooked and Often 
Misunderstood (June 30, 2020), https://blogs.constellation.com/energy-management/line-
losses-overlooked-and-often-misunderstood/#:~:text=The%20quantity%20that%20is% 
20lost,and%20passed%20on%20to%20customers. 
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power.105 Methodologies for incorporating avoided line losses have 
already been developed by NREL106 and PSCs should utilize NREL’s 
expertise in developing avoided cost calculations that include avoided line 
loss benefits of DG systems. Thus, PSCs can rely on the EIA for data 
regarding line losses by state107 and use NREL’s methodologies for 
calculating the benefits that a DG system provides to the utility and its 
consumers to properly account for and include these cost savings that DG 
systems provide to a utility.  
Additionally, avoided cost rates should consider DG’s savings in 
reduced congestion costs.108 Congestion costs occur when there is an 
overload of energy on transmission lines.109 Costs to consumers and 
utilities stemming from congestion vary by region and electricity 
jurisdiction and can be substantial. For example, congestion in the 
Midwest Independent System Operator territory cost consumers $1.24 
billion in 2011.110 Since power supplied by DG systems is produced close 
to load, there is a significant reduction in congestion costs because that 
power avoids transmission lines and instead is inputted directly into local 
distribution lines.111 These benefits of DG systems must be considered in 
developing just and reasonable avoided cost rates. 
As for transmission and distribution capacity, DG systems allow 
utilities to avoid additional infrastructure typically needed when energy is 
added to a utility’s system. Transmission and distribution capacity is the 
cost to the utility for building new or expanding existing transmission 
lines, transformers that step up electric voltage for efficient transport, and 
substations that step the electric voltage down for distribution to 
customers.112 There are also costs of necessary rights of way for 
transmission and distributions lines.113 DG systems provide several 
benefits in terms of decreasing transmission and distribution costs, 
 
105. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at 3–18; Denholm, supra 
note 97, at 20. 
106. Denholm, supra note 99, at 20–27. 
107. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electricity Profiles, EIA (Jan. 25, 
2018), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/archive/2015/ (see Table 10). 
108. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at i, 1–11. 
109. Id. at 3–8. 
110. U.S. Dept. of Energy, National Electric Transmission Congestion 
Study, DOE, xviii (Sept. 2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/ 
2015%20National%20Electric%20Transmission%20Congestion%20Study_0.pdf/. 
111. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at 3–8. 
112. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Distributed Generation of Electricity and its 
Environmental Impacts, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation 
-electricity-and-its-environmental-impacts (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
113. Potential Benefits Report, supra note 96, at 6–3 to 6–4. 
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including reducing and deferring the need for upstream capacity 
(centralized power systems).114 This ultimately reduces the utility’s 
transmission and distribution costs by avoiding the need for transformers, 
lines, substations, and new rights of way.115  
Overall, to ensure that DG projects are being valued consistent 
with PURPA’s requirement that rates be “just and reasonable” and be the 
utility’s “full avoided cost,”116 rate calculations by state utility 
commissions must incorporate the benefits of avoided line losses, reduced 
congestion costs, and decreased costs associated with transmission and 
distribution capacity that are avoided by DG systems. Failure to 
incorporate these benefits of DG systems in avoided costs results in DG 
systems being unjustly underpaid for the generation they provide to the 
utility and its ratepayers. This failure leads to DG developers subsidizing 
the utility, creating an unfair boon to the utility’s profit, and fails to fulfill 
both PURPA’s requirement to “encourage” QF development and the 
principle that ratepayers (as well as the utility) are left “indifferent” as to 
the power they consume.117 
2.  Shorter Lead Times 
Significant financial risks are associated with long lead times of 
centralized power, making valuation of DG’s short lead times an important 
aspect of avoided cost rate calculations.118 Lead time is the time it takes to 
construct, generate, and distribute electricity from a given power plant, 
and longer lead times increase costs to the utility.119 DG systems have 
shorter lead times comparatively, and the three main benefits include 
reducing: (1) the forecasting risks associated with uncertain future 
demand; (2) the financial risk of long construction periods of larger 
installations; and (3) the risk of “technological or regulatory 
obsolescence.”120 FERC has already recognized that reduced lead times 
may produce savings and provide utilities with the ability to adjust for 
demand fluctuations through greater flexibility.121 Just and reasonable 
 
114. Id. at 3–11. 
115. Id. 
116. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304. 
117. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 FERC at 62,080. 
118. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(vii); Lovins, supra note 96, at 117.  
119. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility 
Scale Electricity Generating Plant, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/capitalcost/ 
(last updated April 12, 2013). 
120. Lovins, supra note 96, at 117.  
121. FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,227 (Feb. 25, 1980). 
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avoided cost rate calculations would incorporate the benefits of DGs 
shorter lead times. 
3.  Avoiding Volatility Risks of Fuel Prices 
DG systems, such as wind and solar, do not rely on fossil fuels for 
electricity generation and avoid costly risks associated with market 
variations of fossil fuel costs. Natural gas and other fossil fuels carry with 
them substantial financial risks due to their inherent pricing volatility and 
the difficulty in forecasting prices, which results in month to month 
uncertainty for electricity prices.122 Through a combination of supply 
issues, increasing demand, and other factors, such as extreme weather 
events shutting down production or supply chains, natural gas prices can 
have drastic swings.123 Furthermore, future supply of natural gas is 
debatable, with some uncertainty in supply forecasts;124 thus, if a utility is 
heavily reliant on natural gas for its power it’s ratepayers bear the burden 
of increased economic risk and negative impacts related to price volatility 
of natural gas.  
Conversely, clean energy provides a long-term stable fixed price 
for consumers.125 By providing price stability to consumers, clean energy 
is essentially an insurance policy that reduces risks to consumers against 
increases in fossil fuel prices.126 One potential method to account for DGs’ 
risk reduction in avoided cost calculations would be to use the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, which is a model that describes the relationship 
 
122. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Spot and Future Prices, EIA, 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_fut_s1_a.htm (latest update May 5, 2018). 
123. Comm’n of Envtl. Cooperation, Renewable Energy as a Hedge 
Against Fuel Price Fluctuation: How to Capture the Benefits, CEC, 6, 15 (2008), 
http://www.cec.org/islandora/en/item/2360-renewable-energy-hedge-against-fuel 
-price-fluctuation-en.pdf. 
124. David Hughes, Shale Reality Check: Drilling Into the U.S. 
Government’s Rosy Projections for Shale Gas & Tight Oil Production Through 2050, 
Post Carbon Institute, x, 34, 159 (Winter 2018), http://www.postcarbon.org/ 
publications/shale-reality-check/; Richard Heinberg, Why the New EIA Forecast Is 
Unrealistic, EcoWatch (Feb. 5, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/eia 
-outlook-2018-2531592684.html.  
125. Lori A. Bird, et. al., Renewable Energy Price-Stability Benefits in 
Utility Green Power Programs, NREL, 1 (Aug. 2008), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/ 
fy08osti/43532.pdf. 
126. Id.; see also Denholm, supra note 97, at 50 (concluding: “The 
addition of DGPV (or renewable energy more generally) to an electricity-generation 
portfolio could result in diversity-related benefits, which include providing a physical 
hedge against uncertain future fuel prices and insurance against the impact of higher 
future fuel prices or changes in emissions policy.”).  
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between an energy source’s risk and expected return.127 Ultimately, it is in 
the utility and public’s interest that the financial risks associated with fossil 
fuel systems and DG systems are incorporated in avoided cost rate 
calculations. 
4.  The Public Interest, the Social Cost of Carbon Protocol Tool,  
and the Environmental Benefits of QFs 
As discussed above in part I(B)(3), the public’s interest in 
decreasing the nation’s reliance on fossil fuels is not only an economic 
interest, but also an environmental interest that can and should be 
considered in setting avoided costs. FERC has ruled that since they are a 
necessary aspect of the utility’s full avoided costs, environmental costs 
related to fuel sources should be included in avoided costs calculations 
when those environmental costs are incurred by the utility.128 Additionally, 
as discussed above in section I(B)(3), the Supreme Court’s holdings 
arguably allow for avoided cost calculations to consider other interests 
beyond the economic interests of ratepayers related to merely carbon 
costs.129 The social cost of carbon resulting from the climate and public 
health impacts of burning fossil fuels should be considered in setting 
avoided cost calculations.  
Climate change—indisputably a result of fossil fuel combustion—
is already causing major negative issues in the energy sector, such as 
increased power outages and supply chain disruptions that cost utilities 
and consumers substantial sums of money in the form of blackouts.130 
Increasing temperatures, decreasing water availability, more intense 
storms and extreme weather (including more frequent polar vortexes due 
to instability of jet streams caused by climate change),131 wildfires, and sea 
 
127. Lovins, supra note 96, at 145–53. 
128. So. Cal. Edison, 71 FERC ¶ 61,269, 62,080 (F.E.R.C. June 2, 1995); 
see also Cal. PUC, 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059, 61268 (FERC Oct. 21, 2010). 
129. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 755; Am. Paper Inst., 461 U.S. at 417. 
130. Carbon Disclosure Project, Global Electric Utilities: Building 
business resilience to inevitable climate change, Acclimatise and IBM, Appendix 2 
(2009), https://www.ideiasustentavel.com.br/pdf/ibm_carbon_disclosure_project_ 
2009_electric_utilities.pdf/; U.S. Dept. of Energy, Climate Change: Effects on Our 
Energy, ENERGY.GOV (July 11, 2013), https://www.energy.gov/articles/climate 
-change-effects-our-energy. 
131. UC Davis, Science & Climate: Polar Vortex, https://climatechange. 
ucdavis.edu/climate-change-definitions/what-is-the-polar-vortex/ (last visited Apr. 
28, 2021); see also Dana Nuccitelli, Climate lessons from Texas’ frozen power 
outages, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Feb. 23, 2021) https://yaleclimate 
connections.org/2021/02/the-climate-lesson-from-texas-frozen-power-outages/. 
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level rise are all projected to continue to negatively affect the production 
and transmission of electricity in the United States with increasing 
severity.132 Overall, shutdowns and disruptions related to weather have 
substantial financial impacts to the public and utilities with an estimated 
yearly cost ranging from $25 to $70 billion per year.133 While accounting 
for carbon pricing in avoided costs, as discussed above, accounts for 
potential economic-based regulations surrounding carbon emissions, there 
are many other costly externalities associated with fossil fuel-based 
generation that should be accounted for in avoided cost calculations so that 
those calculations represent the utility’s actual full avoided costs. 
Unlike centralized generation, DG systems have substantial 
potential to reduce a utility’s financial impacts and risk from climate-
related extreme weather events. DG systems have been identified as a 
technology that is resilient to extreme weather events and can “maintain 
service and minimize system vulnerabilities” related to disruptions caused 
by extreme weather.134 Thus, there is a significant economic value in the 
increased reliability that DG systems provide utilities. Therefore, if the law 
requires calculation of the utility’s full avoided cost, the cost savings that 
DG systems provide by increasing resilience to extreme weather events 
must be incorporated. 
In addition to including the climate change risk avoidance benefits 
of DG systems in avoided cost calculations, the public health and societal 
consequences of burning fossil fuels, also known as the social cost of 
carbon, should also be considered in avoided cost calculations. In order to 
truly set rates in the public interest, PSCs should utilize the Social Cost of 
Carbon Protocol Tool (SCC Tool) in evaluating utility resource planning 
documents and proposed new generation resources. The SCC Tool “is a 
measure, in dollars, of the long-term damage done by a ton of carbon 
 
132. U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate 
Change and Extreme Weather, ENERGY.GOV, i (July 2013) https://www.energy.gov/ 
sites/prod/files/2013/07/f2/20130716-Energy%20Sector%20Vulnerabilities%20Report. 
pdf; Carbon Disclosure Project, Global Electric Utilities: Building business resilience 
to inevitable climate change, Acclimatise and IBM, Appendix 2 (2009), https:// 
www.2degreesnetwork.com/groups/2degrees-community/resources/carbon-disclosure-
project-2008-global-electric-utilities-adaptation-challenge_2/attachments/8294/. 
133. Executive Office of the President, Economic Benefits Of Increasing 
Electric Grid Resilience To Weather Outages, THE WHITE HOUSE, 17 (Aug. 2013) 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_
FINAL.pdf. 
134. Id. at 15; U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to 
Climate Change and Extreme Weather, ENERGY.gov, 43 (July 2013) https://www. 
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/f2/20130716-Energy%20Sector%20Vulnerabilities% 
20Report.pdf.  
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dioxide (CO2) emissions in a given year.”135 The SCC Tool focuses on 
quantifying the climate change damage of rulemakings on the federal 
level, including changes in the cost of energy.136 By using the SCC Tool, 
PSCs can equate the amount of carbon dioxide that a clean energy DG 
system avoids compared to other sources in their energy mix and provide 
additional compensation to the DG system for helping to reduce climate-
associated risks and costs for the utility.  
Indeed, this is not an unprecedented idea. The Colorado PSC 
recently ordered that the SCC Tool must be used to place a price on fossil 
fuel resource planning proposals, including the Social Cost of Carbon of 
$43 per ton beginning in 2022, increasing to $69 per ton in 2050.137 Other 
PSCs throughout the nation should also rely on the SCC Tool in 
quantifying the true costs of fossil fuel based resources and incorporate 
those avoided costs in avoided cost calculations for clean energy projects.  
B. Case Study on Avoided Cost Methodologies  
Implementation of avoided cost calculations varies across the 
country and from state-to-state. The rate paid to a QF must be equal to the 
utilities’ full avoided costs, but due to varying methodologies used by 
PSCs throughout the country, the avoided costs that DG systems provide 
are not always incorporated in avoided cost calculations. While some 
states arguably appear to be actively pursuing ways to decrease the 
viability of qualifying DG projects,138 others have incorporated a few of 
the above benefits in their standardized avoided cost rates. Michigan 
recently took positive steps at implementing PURPA’s avoided cost rates 
to account for the full avoided costs of DG development. 
 
135. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Social Cost of Carbon, EPA (Jan. 19, 
2017) https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html. 
136. Id.  
137. In the Matter of Application of the Public Service Company of 
Colorado for Approval of Its 2016 Electric Resource Plan, Proceeding No. 16A-
0396E, Decision No. C17-0316, ¶ 87 (Mar. 23, 2017). 
138. Tom Lutey, Hot Mic Records Troubling Conversation About Solar 
Regulations, BILLINGS GAZETTE (June 27, 2017), http://billingsgazette.com/news/ 
government-and-politics/hot-mic-records-troubling-conversation-about-solar-regulations/ 
article_8499a49d-e281-5dd7-aae7-aecccfa0394e.html; Robert Walton, Idaho Regulators 
Reduce PURPA Contracts from 20 to 2 Years, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 25, 2015), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/idaho-regulators-reduce-purpa-contracts-from-20-to-2 
-years/404518/. 
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1.  Michigan  
On November 21, 2017 the Michigan Public Service Commission 
(“MI-PSC”) promulgated avoided cost methodologies that account for the 
fair valuation of some, but not all, of the benefits of QF DG projects.139 In 
its order, the MI-PSC set the design capacity of standardized QFs at two 
MW and set contract lengths for five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years, at the 
QF’s option.140 Additionally, the order dictated that the appropriate 
method for developing avoided cost rates is a “hybrid-proxy method.”141 
This method splits avoided capacity and energy costs between two proxies, 
with the former being compared to a natural gas combustion turbine 
(“NGCT”) and the latter a natural gas combined cycle unit (“NGCC”).142  
The hybrid-proxy method accounts for the true avoided costs of 
an electric utility by assuming that if the utility only needs capacity then it 
would build a NGCT “peaker” plant, whereas if it needed additional 
energy it would build a NGCC plant.143 NGCT peaker plants cost the 
utility more than NGCC plants, and because QF systems generally provide 
incremental capacity increases, which over time result in energy increases, 
a hybrid-proxy method results in avoided cost rates that better encompass 
a utility’s avoided costs than simply using an NGCC as the proxy for both 
energy and capacity.  
Further, the MI-PSC required that avoided line losses and DG’s 
value during on-peak times must be incorporated in setting avoided cost 
rates.144 Overall, the total on-peak energy rate provided by the MI-PSC 
ranged from $48.31 to $56.46 per MW hour over a 20-year contract, 
pending on the option chosen by the QF.145 While the MI-PSC did not go 
as far as to require inclusion of all of DG’s benefits in avoided cost 
calculations, the MI-PSC made a step in the right direction and is 
continuing to develop methods of quantifying all of DG’s benefits.146 
 
139. MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, In re Consumers Energy Company, Case 
No. U-18090, 32 (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/U 
-18090_11_21_2017_606668_7.pdf. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 3. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 31. 
144. Id. at 27–28, 33. 
145. Id. at Attachment 1, 2–3.  
146. See MICH. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, Report on the MPSC Staff Study to 
Develop a Cost of Service-Based Distribution Generation Program Tariff (Feb. 21, 
2018), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/MPSC_Staff_DG_Report_with_ 
Appendices_614779_7.pdf. 
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Subsequent to the November 2017 order, the MI-PSC developed 
methodologies in a report to incorporate DG’s benefits in avoided cost rate 
calculations.147 The MI-PSC report found that PURPA allows for PSCs to 
consider more than just capacity, energy, and line loss values, including 
considerations of hedge value against volatile fossil fuel prices, reduction 
of air emissions, and other environmental compliance costs.148 The MI-
PSC report recommended that a fair valuation method for DG projects 
consists of two parts: “(1) an avoided capital and energy cost; and (2) all 
other avoided cost or benefit elements such as avoided distribution line 
losses, transmission and distribution costs, avoided air emission and 
environmental cost, the solar-fuel price hedge, and reactive supply and 
voltage control.”149 The report concluded that solar DG projects provide 
the following benefits: A general “value of solar” levelized capacity value 
of 4.7 cents per kWh and a 20-year energy value of 5.1 cents per kWh; a 
2.37 percent transmission loss factor; and a distribution line loss factor 
ranging from 4.63 percent to 9.74 percent.150  
Overall, with the report’s recommendations applying to cases 
starting on June 1, 2018, and the MI-PSC’s stated intentions to continue 
working to incorporate environmental benefits into avoided cost 
calculations, the MI-PSC continues to progress towards developing 
avoided cost rates that appropriately encompass DG’s many benefits. With 
these developments, Michigan is poised for significant growth in DG 
projects.151 Overall, the MI-PSC appears to be on the right track of 
incorporating all of DG’s benefits and other PSCs around the nation should 
follow and expand on MI-PSC’s lead in the effort to quantify the benefits 
of DG systems. Doing so leads to better compliance with PURPA’s 
mandate that QF’s be entitled to the utility’s full avoided cost.  
IV. BUILDING RESILIENCY VIA COMMUNITY  
POWER PROJECTS AND PURPA 
While PSCs can and should use PURPA’s avoided cost 
requirements to incentivize development of local DG projects, state 
legislatures also have a role in increasing local clean energy development 
 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at Appendix E, 3.  
149. Id. at 15. 
150. Id. at Appendix E – 3. 
151. Andy Balaskovitz, Advocates Say Solar Poised For Growth Under 
Latest Regulatory Changes in Michigan, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Nov. 28, 2017), 
http://midwestenergynews.com/2017/11/28/advocates-say-solar-poised-for-growth 
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by promulgating legislation that enables community power DG projects. 
Community power is the concept that community members own, develop, 
or share in the production and/or use of clean energy primarily through 
community-scale DG solar and wind projects.152 Community power 
projects work by expanding access of DG power to community members 
who cannot install a solar or wind systems because they are renters, have 
shaded roofs or limited yard space, or are inhibited financially.153 
Community power in Europe has been established for decades. Seventy to 
eighty percent of wind energy projects in Denmark are owned under 
community ownership, and around 50 percent of clean energy projects in 
Germany under community ownership.154  
The community power trend is also taking hold in the United 
States. As of 2018, sixteen states had laws enabling community power in 
place, and activity around community power projects is buzzing in nearly 
every state.155 In addition to initiatives at the state level, action at the 
federal level was recently initiated via the CLEAN Future Act, which 
would explicitly amend PURPA to include language supporting the 
establishment of community solar programs.156 Community power 
projects not only come with the many benefits of DG projects discussed 
above, including decreasing emissions, reducing consumer exposure to 
volatile prices of fuel, and increasing grid reliability, but they also produce 
other benefits including creation of local employment opportunities and a 
revenue base for community needs.157 Overall, community power provides 
significant benefits to the public, and by combining the benefits of PURPA 
 
152. John Farrell, Beyond Sharing: How Communities Can Take Ownership 
of Renewable Power, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, 6 (April 2016) 
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Final-Beyond-Sharing-How-Communities 
-Can-Take-Ownership-of-Renewable-Power.pdf; J. Roberts, et. al, Community Power: 
Model legal frameworks for citizen-owned renewable energy, CLIENTEARTH, 4, (June 
2014) https://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/ 
documents/smodel_legal_frameworks_2014.pdf.  
153. Jason Coughlin, et. al, A Guide to Community Shared Solar: Utility, 
Private, and Nonprofit Project Development, NREL, 3 (May 2012), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54570.pdf. 
154. J. Roberts, supra note 152, at 6–7. 
155. Interstate Renewable Energy Council, State Shared Renewable 
Energy Program Catalog, IREC, https://irecusa.org/regulatory-reform/shared 
-renewables/state-shared-renewable-energy-program-catalog/ (last visited Nov. 17, 
2020); Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Community Power Map, ILSR, 
https://ilsr.org/community-power-map/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
156. See CLEAN Future Act, H.R. ____, 117th Cong. § 225 (2021).  
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with other community power incentives in community power legislation, 
states can act to encourage development and help communities realize 
localized energy independence. 
A. Community Power in the United States 
Several states have unlocked the potential of community power 
projects. As of 2020, through enabling legislation and other incentives, 
total installed capacity of community solar projects was around 2,759 
MWs in the United States spread around 40 different states. For 
comparison, the average United States home uses around 10.7 MWs per 
year.158 Over the next five years, United States community solar is 
expected to increase by some 3.4 gigawatts, enough to power around 
650,000 homes.159 One factor that could further increase community 
power development is to allow community power developers to obtain 
PURPA’s avoided cost incentives for any remaining energy that is 
unsubscribed to by community members. This could provide an important 
mechanism to increase independent development of community power 
projects by ensuring that developers of community power projects will 
receive a return on investment regardless of whether all of the power is 
subscribed to by community members. By combining PURPA and 
community power incentives, further growth in community solar and other 
clean energy projects could be realized.  
Another important overlap between community power projects 
and PURPA is community electric cooperatives’ obligation to purchase 
electricity from QFs that was recently clarified by FERC. Prior to 2015, 
electric cooperatives’ purchase of QF energy was limited to the percent 
dictated in their electricity contract with the utility that they purchase 
electricity from, however, in 2015 FERC concluded that such contractual 
obligations violated PURPA’s mandatory requirement for utilities to 
purchase energy and capacity from QFs.160 The 2015 FERC order 
effectively held that community electric cooperatives are required to 
purchase energy and capacity from QFs where those projects are built, 
regardless of existing contractual obligations with a utility that places 
limits on the amount of power a community cooperative can generate or 
 
158. SEIA, Community Solar, SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION 
(2021), https://www.seia.org/initiatives/community-solar; see also Smart Electric 
Power Alliance, Community Solar Program Design Models, 6, https://sepapower.org/ 
resource/community-solar-program-designs-2018-version/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2021). 
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160. Delta-Montrose Electric Assn., 151 FERC ¶ 61,238, 62,584–85 
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purchase from independent producers.161 In other words, PURPA’s QF 
mandatory purchase requirements supersede other contractual obligations 
that community cooperatives and utilities have, and a utility cannot 
penalize an electric cooperative for fulfilling their mandate under PURPA 
when a QF is developed within their electric cooperative area.162 In 
essence, FERC’s order provides electric cooperatives with additional 
authority to purchase power from QFs, which unleashes potential for the 
development of community DG QF projects where electric cooperatives 
exist.  
B. Case Studies on Community Power Legislation 
The following case studies provide examples of two states that 
have enacted state laws enabling community power projects. While 
Minnesota, Massachusetts, and New York lead the way in total installed 
MW capacity of community solar programs,163 this article focuses on two 
western states’ community power programs: Oregon and Colorado. 
Oregon’s community power legislation provides an example for linking 
PURPA’s avoided cost and community power incentives together. While 
Colorado’s community power legislation does not provide a mechanism 
linking PURPA’s incentives, it does include important provisions that 
should be expanded by Oregon and other states. In addition to Oregon and 
Colorado, Minnesota also provides a good example of community solar 
legislation, but is not the focus of this paper.164  
While the following examples apply to two and three MW 
projects, to further incentivize community power projects, the generating 
capacity for community power projects should be expanded to a minimum 
of ten MWs, as this size has been found to achieve the lowest installed cost 
for consumers based on economies of scale evaluations.165 Additionally, 
community power legislation should consider expanding community 
power programs to other clean sources of energy rather than limiting the 
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improvement, these two states provide good insight into how community 
power legislation can be structured. 
1.  Oregon 
In March 2016, the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 1547 
(hereafter, “Community Solar Bill”), which enabled development of 
community solar projects.166 The Community Solar Bill delegated 
rulemaking authority to the Oregon Public Utility Commission (OR-PUC) 
to establish rules for the “procurement of electricity from community solar 
projects.”167 The Community Solar Bill directs the OR-PUC to establish 
project capacity requirements, certify projects, prescribe application 
processes, and require electric utilities to enter into 20-year power 
purchase agreements with qualifying projects.168 Additionally, the OR-
PUC is required to adopt rules that protect the public interest, incentivize 
ownership or subscription of community power projects, minimize cost-
shifting from program ratepayers to ratepayers not involved, and protect 
participants from undue hardship when an electric utility is the owner of 
the community power project.169  
Further, the Community Solar Bill sets baseline parameters for 
project participation, including that the project must have a minimum 
capacity of 25 kWs and must be located in Oregon.170 Similar to PURPA’s 
avoided costs, the Bill benefits community participants by requiring 
utilities to provide bill credits according to the electricity generated by the 
participant at the resource value of solar at the time the PPA is entered into 
or through a rate adopted by the OR-PUC, if it has good cause to adopt a 
different rate.171 These bill credits are similar to avoided costs, however, 
they take a resource specific approach in their credits as they provide 
credits based on the value of solar, not a different fuel source as a proxy, 
as is often done in avoided cost calculations.  
As a result of the passage of the Community Solar Bill, in June of 
2017, the OR-PUC promulgated a rulemaking outlining the framework of 
the program, which is briefly summarized below with a focus on how the 
OR-PUC’s order connects PURPA’s avoided cost incentives with the Bill. 
To obtain certification as a community solar project, the project must have 
 
166. 2016 OR. LAWS 1547 §§ 22 et. seq. (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 
757.386 (2016)). 
167. Id. at § 22(2)(a). 
168. Id. at § 22(2)(a)(A)–(D). 
169. Id. 
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171. Id. at § 22(6)(a)–(b). 
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subscription to at least 50 percent of the project’s stated capacity.172 The 
OR-PUC adopted the 50 percent subscription and also removed a 
provision that limited the sale of unsold or unsubscribed generation to 10 
percent. Importantly, the OR-PUC ordered that any unsold or 
unsubscribed to generation must be purchased by the utility at the PURPA 
avoided cost rate.173 The OR-PUC also required a utility to enter into a 20-
year PPA to purchase any unsold or unsubscribed generation.174 This 
action by the OR-PUC has significant potential to increase development 
of community solar projects by independent developers because it 
provides independent developers with a financial incentive to develop 
projects, allowing that the project’s generation is not entirely subscribed 
to.  
In addition to providing PURPA’s avoided cost incentives, the 
OR-PUC took several other actions in its order. The OR-PUC set the initial 
program capacity at 2.5 percent of each of Oregon’s three investor-owned 
utilities system capacity, which adds up to a total of 160 MW, however, 
they reserved the right to adjust all aspects of the program.175 On the 
project level, the OR-PUC limited development to three MWs or less per 
project and required that participants of the project be located in the 
utility’s service territory.176 Participant ownership or subscription may not 
exceed the customer’s average annual electricity consumption in the 
service territory, nor may their interest or subscription exceed forty percent 
of the project’s capacity.177 Further, participants may not own or subscribe 
to more than two MWs across multiple projects or, when in combination 
with affiliates, a total of four MWs.178  
Furthermore, the electric utilities that have a community project 
in its service territory are required to make payments in the form of net 
metering to the project participants.179 As for siting requirements, the only 
requirement is that the project be located within the Oregon territory of a 
utility and be less than three MWs.180 Additionally, the OR-PUC’s order 
included a low-income requirement, providing that at least ten percent of 
the project’s generating capacity be allocated to low-income residents and 
 
172. OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, In the Matter of Rules Regarding Comm. 
Solar Projects, Order No. 17232, Appendix A 4–5 (June 29, 2017), 
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provided the authority of the OR-PUC to develop a funding mechanism 
for low-income residents to become involved in the program.181 
Overall, Oregon’s Community Solar Bill does a good job at 
blending PURPA’s avoided cost incentives and community solar program 
incentives. The mechanism that allows for up to 50 percent of any unsold 
or unsubscribed to generation to be sold by the developer at the PURPA 
avoided cost rate could act to increase interest and investment in local 
community solar projects by independent developers, as it should provide 
a further economic incentive for independent developers to get involved 
in community solar programs by minimizing risk and increasing return on 
investment prospects. Further, requiring a 20-year contract allows better 
access to finances and investment for developers of community solar 
projects. In addition to the above OR-PSC’s order that provides a general 
framework for how the Community Solar Bill will be ran, further details 
on the program have been developed by the OR-PUC in the Community 
Solar Program Implementation Manual.182 As of February 2021, the OR-
PUC had approved three community solar projects to begin operation.183 
While Oregon’s PURPA provision in its Community Solar Bill is 
a provision that should be included in community power legislation, the 
ultimate impact of such a provision, if incorporated in other states, is 
highly dependent on how avoided costs are calculated and whether they 
account for DG’s many benefits. 
2.  Colorado 
In 2010, Colorado enacted its Community Solar Gardens Act 
(“CSGA”) and recently expanded the scope of the CSGA to include other 
forms of clean energy.184 The CSGA has been very successful in 
incentivizing growth of community solar projects with 70 projects in 
operation, totaling more than 50 MWs.185 The CSGA’s purpose is to 
encourage investment and authorize the creation of community solar 
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projects.186 The CSGA recognizes that local communities benefit from the 
development of local clean energy projects and that community 
participation in solar generation is in the public interest.187  
The CSGA has some similarities and many differences when 
compared to Oregon’s Community Solar Bill. The CSGA outlines that 
certified projects can only be two MWs or less (unlike Oregon’s three 
MWs) and are owned by ten or more customers at a shared location.188 
Additionally, unlike Oregon’s limitations on size of 
ownership/subscription to the participants’ average annual electricity 
consumption or 40 percent of the total project generation, the CSGA 
allows participants to have ownership/subscription up to 120 percent of 
the participants’ average annual electric consumption.189 Similar to the 
Oregon Bill, the CSGA also provides that organizations and companies 
may participate in community solar gardens.190 Further, like the Oregon 
Bill, the CSGA also directs the CO-PUC to encourage participation in the 
program by low income residents.191  
As for providing incentives for independent developers to build 
community clean energy projects, the CSGA and the CO-PUC took a 
different strategy than Oregon. For unsubscribed generation at community 
projects, the CSGA requires the utility to purchase the unsubscribed 
generation and renewable energy credits at the utility’s incremental hourly 
electricity cost during the preceding year.192 In August 2011, the CO-PUC 
specifically ordered that the developer of the community solar garden may 
contract with the utility for the sale of any unsubscribed generation.193 In 
other words, the rate appears to be effectively somewhat of an as-available 
rate based on the data on the hourly cost of energy during the preceding 
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year, unlike the OR-PUC that simply required unsubscribed generation be 
sold at PURPA’s standard avoided cost rate. For a community solar project 
that is two MWs or less, the as available rate based on one-year of data, 
rather than the avoided cost rate under PURPA, may present some barriers 
to the developer in obtaining a sufficient rate for the unsubscribed 
generation that allows for adequate assurances of return on investment.  
In determining customer payments, the CSGA takes a different 
approach than the Oregon’s Community Solar Program. The CSGA 
provides net-metering payments to customers by multiplying the 
subscriber’s share of the electricity production by the retail rate per kW 
hour of the electric utility, minus a reasonable charge as determined by the 
CO-PUC to cover distribution, integration, and administration costs of the 
solar garden by the utility.194 Additionally, the CSGA requires certain 
responsibilities for the owner of the solar garden, such as sharing real-time 
data with the electric utility and information on the percentage of shares 
that should be used for determining net metering credits.195  
Overall, the CSGA program has been successful and provides 
another good example for developing community solar legislation. 
However, the CSGA and the CO-PUC could work to increase the 
connection to PURPA’s avoided costs, which could provide further 
incentives for community solar projects in Colorado. Potentially, by 
requiring standardized avoided cost rates be applied to the sale of 
unsubscribed generation instead of being based on one-year of as-available 
hourly data of the applicable utility, the CSGA, depending on how CO-
PUC calculates avoided cost rates, could further increase development of 
community solar projects in Colorado.  
V. CONCLUSION 
By accounting for the full benefits of local distributed generation 
clean energy projects in PURPA’s avoided cost calculations and enacting 
community power legislation, states throughout the country can realize 
localized energy independence and increase grid resiliency and reliability. 
PSCs have a critical role in incentivizing development of DG projects by 
ensuring that they are implementing avoided cost methodologies that 
account for all of DGs benefits and allow for those projects to be 
compensated at the utility’s full avoided cost rate as PURPA requires. 
PSCs should conduct studies, similar to that done by the Michigan PSC, 
and enact orders that require avoided cost calculations incorporate all of 
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DG’s benefits. State legislatures likewise have the opportunity to build 
upon efforts by PSCs through promulgating statutes that enable and 
incentivize development of community power projects. Specifically, state 
legislatures should enact legislation that incentivizes community power 
development by independent developers through making PURPA’s 
avoided cost benefits available for community power projects where 
unsubscribed energy is present. Overall, together, PSCs and state 
legislatures, along with FERC, are the key to enabling further localized 
energy independence that would lead to a clean, reliable, and resilient 
energy grid.  
While the conclusions and recommendations in this article remain 
important moving forward with broader integration and development of 
local DG clean energy projects, there are several unknowns that could 
positively or negatively impact the conclusions and recommendations of 
this paper. Areas of consideration moving forward related to PURPA and 
community power programs include Congress’ consideration to amend 
PURPA,196 whether FERC Order No. 872 survives the various legal 
challenges, as well as the potential rescinding of the rule as a result of 
changes to the make-up of the five-member panel of FERC upcoming in 
June 2021, and whether the CLEAN Future Act proposed in the United 
States Congress is passed. An additional variable that could serve to 
increase QF development throughout the United States is the increase in 
energy storage technologies and the coupling of QF energy with storage.197 
Moreover, an additional and significant hurdle to expanded QF 
development is continued negative actions by state PSCs including 
shortening contract lengths, relying on avoided cost methodologies that 
fail to account for a QF’s full avoided costs, and including excessive 
deductions to avoided costs that all have the combined effect of killing the 
development prospects of QF projects.  
Ultimately, time will tell whether regulatory bodies around the 
nation will take the necessary steps—and importantly, work cooperatively 
together—to further enable the development of clean, reliable, and 
resilient distributed generation projects so as to achieve local energy 
independence, or if those regulatory bodies will dig their heels in and force 
communities to remain stuck in the past with expensive centralized, fossil 
fuel-based energy along with its numerous economic, environmental, and 
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public health consequences. The next few years should provide significant 
insight into the future of electricity in communities throughout the United 
States, and ideally—for the good of our environment, public health, grid 
reliability and resiliency—that future contains an emphasis on localized 
energy independence. 
